We investigate the stock market crashes in China, Iceland, and the US in the 2007-2009 period. The bond stock earnings yield difference model is used as a prediction tool. Historically, when the measure is too high, meaning that long bond interest rates are too high relative to the trailing earnings over price ratio, then there usually is a crash of 10% or more within four to twelve months. The model did in fact predict all three crashes. Iceland had a drop of fully 95%, China fell by two thirds and the US by 57%.
Background
The second author started using the bond stock earnings yield model while in Tokyo consulting at the Yamaichi Research Institute in 1988. The model relates the yield on stocks (measured by the ratio of earnings to stock prices) to the yield on nominal Treasury bonds. The theory behind the model is that an optimal asset allocation between stocks and bonds is related to their relative yields and when the bond yield is too high, a market adjustment is needed and there is a shift out of stocks into bonds. If the adjustment is large, it causes an equity market correction (a decline of 10% within one year). Hence, there is a short term negative equity risk premium (ERP). A study of the October 1987 stock market crash illustrated the model and it was from this episode that the model was discovered in Ziemba's crash study group. Table 1 and Figure 1 show that the model went into the danger zone, that is the measure was above an upper confidence limit, in April 1987 with a spread of 3.39. The S&P500 was then at 289.32. By the end of September the S&P500 was at 318.66 with the measure higher at 4.14. After the crash at the end of October, the S&P500 had fallen to 245.01 with the spread falling out of the danger zone to 1.64. Table 1 has beginning of months values.
Continuous daily values are in Figure 1 and one sees a sharp move up in the measure to 4.42, in September 1987 way above the upper limit .
There are various ways that one can compute the upper and lower limits but experience has shown that with the various approaches, all of which use out of sample prior data, one usually has the same conclusion. In Figure 1 , the limits are simply the trailing mean plus or minus a standard deviation Upper limit 2.09 415.00
Lower limit -0.13 309.00 measure so the one sided limits hold 95% of the probability. 1 Using a different index rather than the S&P500 has the same conclusion but slightly different results. Berge, Consigli and Ziemba (2008) used the MSCI index. The danger zone was entered in May 1987 and the correction occurred in October, four months later.
During June, July and August investors kept rebalancing their portfolios from the bond to the equity market (MSCI TRI + 13.87% over the quarter) then the equity market fell 31.80% in the following quarter (September to November 1987) with the major decline in
Moving Average and Signal Chart
In the following sections we use a moving average and a rolling horizon standard deviation to establish the confidence levels. The h-day moving average at time t, denoted by µ h t , and the corresponding rolling horizon standard deviation σ h t are
Using rolling horizon means and standard deviations provide data consistency. This is used to compute confidence levels for the BSEYD measure. In particular, rolling horizon mean and standard deviation are not overly sensitive to the starting date of the bond yield or stock market data, or to the overall number of data points. However, the choice of the horizon parameter h is subjective.
For our analysis of the US market, we use a five year horizon, so h = 1260 as longer time horizons tend to generate a robust signal and eliminate false positives. Five years of historical bond and stocks data may be a difficult requirement outside of major markets. For Iceland and China, we use a one year rolling horizon, but tighten the confidence level in order to eliminate false positives. The idea behind the BSEYD model is that a crash signal should occur whenever
BSEY D(t) > CL(t)
where CL(t) represents a one-tail confidence level. The level CL acts as a time-varying threshold for the crash signal.
Equivalently, we define the signal directly as
So, a crash signal should occur whenever
Graphically, the threshold for the crash signal is now an horizontal line with value 0, as shown below in Figures 5(b) , 6(b), 4 and 13. These graphs show a calculation of SIGN AL(t) based respectively on a standard one-tail 95% confidence level and on an application of Cantelli's inequality.
An examination of the BSEYD spread distributions reveals their nonNormal nature (see Figures 3, 7, 11 and 19 . As a result, standard confidence intervals which are based on a Gaussian assumption may prove inaccurate.
In this case, we use Cantelli's inequality, a one-tailed version of Chebyshev's inequality, to derive a 'worst case' confidence level (see, for example, Problem 7.11.9 in Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2001 ).
Cantelli's inequality relates the probability that the distance between a random variable X and its mean µ exceeds a number k > 0 of standard deviations σ to this distance
The parameter α provides an upper bound for a one-tailed confidence level on any distribution, regardless of how different it is from a Normal distribution.
We use Cantelli's inequality with a one-tail confidence level to assess the relative strength of a signal. Using the one-tail confidence level, we obtain the crash signal. We then find the Cantelli probability α giving us a similar signal date. To generate the same signal as a standard 95% confidence level, we need to select α = 27% in Cantelli's inequality. Similarly, to generate the same signal as a standard 99% confidence level, we need to select α = 15.60%
In the case of China, as discussed in section 3, we used a standard 99% confidence level to determine the signal. Based on Cantelli's inequality, we expect in the worst case to have a crash signal 15.60% of the time. Retrospectively, Cantelli's inequality is rather severe since it places the threshold for a signal at a BSEYD spread of 3% or above, on 520 consecutive trading days from September 9, 2007 to February 2, 2009 out of the 2099 days (i.e. 24.77% of days) where this measure was computed. By contrast, if we consider the distribution over the entire period, we observe that the spread only exceeded 2.52% on 0.03% of all instances. To conclude, a standard 99% confidence level would have been sufficient to determine a clear crash signal.
In the case of Iceland, as discussed in section 4, we use a 95% confidence level to determine the signal, Cantelli's inequality suggests a worst case probability that 27% of observations could result in a signal. However, lowering the Cantelli probability α from 27% to 20% (corresponding roughly to a standard 97.7% confidence level) does not result in significant loss of responsiveness of the signal, at least for Glitnir and Kaupthing (see Figures   13b,d ). Ziemba (2011) gives an historical account of his use of this model from 1988 to 2011 in the US, Japan and other countries. Twelve times the signal was in the danger zone from 1948 to 1988 and each time the Nikkei Stock Average index fell at least 10% from the level when the signal was reached.
During this forty year period, the index had twenty such falls of which eight occurred for reasons other than high interest rates relative to earnings. The BSEYD model also predicted the -56% crash that started in January 1990 with a signal further in the danger zone than at any time since 1948.
The Fed model, which is the ratio not the difference like the original model, is mathematically equivalent to this model, as now shown.
The Fed model in its original 1996 form states the dependence of a fair stock price levelp(t) at time t to the expected earnings, E(t), and the most liquid (10-or 30-year) Treasury bond rate r(t). Earnings expectations are incorporated in prices and discounted viã
Equity earnings per share γ(t) is the expected earnings for a unit investment in the stock market with equity shares, S(t), namely
There is a direct relationship between the equity yield in Equation (2) and the long bond rate in Equation (1) . The ratio of the current market value to the theoretical value is the Fed model bond stock yield ratio BSYR(t)
The bond stock earnings yield differential that we focus on in this paper is related to the valuation measure and the equity yield via
The differential reflects the difference between the current market value and its theoretical value. A more theoretically sound motivation for the predictive ability of the BSEYD is using the basic Gordon formula, where EP is the forward earnings yield (which Schwartz and Ziemba (2000) show is the best predictor of at least individual Japanese stock prices), E/P -nominal yield = equity risk premium -real growth -inflation.
So the BSEYD can be used as a proxy for the unobservable right hand side economic variables.
For given equity yield the BSEYD and the BSYR can be used to identify zones of under and over valuation and forecast possible forthcoming market adjustments. Koivu, Pennanen and Ziemba (2005) by Modigliani and Cohn (1979) is not taken into consideration. Secondly, the model assumes the comparability of earning price ratios, a real quantity, with a nominal, bond induced, interest rate [Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) , Asness (2000 Asness ( , 2003 , and Ritter and Warr (2002) However, our concern is whether or not the model actually predicts stock market crashes, stock market rallies and good times to be in and out of stock markets. Berge, Consigli and Ziemba (2008) In fact, a full 9.32% of all actual observations occur at or above 1.78%, a marked contrast from the 5% predicted by the Gaussian distribution. Raising the confidence level to 99% or increasing the rolling horizon does help reduce the impact of the shape of the distribution on the signal. crash of -95% in the equity index and a currency collapse. The equity index, see Table 3 , had 15 stocks in it with three of the banks having very high weighting: Kaupthing (26.5%), Lansbanki (13.0%) and Glitnir (12.3%) were more than half the market capitalization and Actavis Banki had 9.9%, and FL Banki another 6.7%. So the banks were close to two thirds of the index value. And index funds that tracked the market actually slightly over weight these banks to yield higher returns. Figure 9 shows how quickly the crash occurred. However, the notable sharp sell-offs, were, to a large extent, blips before the big crash and there was a question whether these investments could continue to produce similar returns, and if not, whether that would prompt investors to seek other markets. Table 4 summarizes the year by year story and Figure 9 shows the index values from 1998 to August 31, 2011. show the BSEYM using Cantelli's inequality to account for the non-normality of the BSEYD measure. Figure 13 shows the signal dates. We focus on the largest banks because they led the market into the collapse and they are a majority of the index weighting. The smallest cap stocks in the index were in the danger zone in 2006 but not the large banks and the overall index was not in the danger zone then as discussed in the book Ziemba and Ziemba (2007) . • The market reaches its peak on October 17, 2007.
The crash model works out well for Lansbanki: the signal identifies the market crashes and two large declines. Although the signal could be clearer for Glitnir and Kaupthing, we do not observe any false positives. None of these major markets were in the danger zone then. Table 6 ln BSEY R(t) = ln r(t) γ(t) = ln r(t) − ln γ(t). 
Final remarks
The bond stock earnings yield model has been shown to be useful in a number of contexts. First, using it for being in or out of the market over long investment periods has been shown to produce about double the returns of buy and hold with lower risk in five major countries. Secondly, over the years, the model has predicted many significant stock market crashes such as those in China, Iceland and the US during [2007] [2008] [2009] . Finally it has possible, but less clear, use concerning when to re-enter markets after a crash.
